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Purpose: Social intervention strategies to mitigate COVID-19 are examined using an agent-based simulation
model. Outbreak in a large urban region, Miami-Dade County, Florida, USA is used as a case study. Results are
intended to serve as a planning guide for decision makers.
Methods: The simulation model mimics daily social mixing behavior of the susceptible and infected generating
the spread. Data representing demographics of the region, virus epidemiology, and social interventions shapes
model behavior. Results include daily values of infected, reported, hospitalized, and dead.
Results: Results show that early implementation of complete stay-at-home order is effective in ﬂattening and reversing the infection growth curve in a short period of time. Whereas, using Florida's Phase II plan alone could
result in 75% infected and end of pandemic via herd immunity. Universal use of face masks reduced infected
by 20%. A further reduction of 66% was achieved by adding contact tracing with a target of identifying 50% of
the asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic.
Conclusions: In the absence of a vaccine, the strict stay-at-home order, though effective in curbing a pandemic
outbreak, leaves a large proportion of the population susceptible. Hence, there should be a strong follow up
plan of social distancing, use of face mask, contact tracing, testing, and isolation of infected to minimize the
chances of large-scale resurgence of the disease. However, as the economic cost of the complete stay-at-homeorder is very high, it can perhaps be used only as an emergency ﬁrst response, and the authorities should be prepared to activate a strong follow up plan as soon as possible. The target level for contact tracing was shown to
have a nonlinear impact on the reduction of the percentage of population infected. Increase in contact tracing target from 20% to 30% appeared to provide the largest incremental beneﬁt.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Introduction
Emergence of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus
type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was ﬁrst reported on December 31, 2019 in
Wuhan, China and subsequently declared a global pandemic on March
11 by the World Health Organization (WHO) [3,52]. As of Sept. 9,
2020, the number of reported cases worldwide has reached over 27.5
million causing 897,789 deaths. The number of infected cases continues
to rise quite signiﬁcantly [2]. The U.S. has been among the hardest hit by
the coronavirus pandemic with 6.3+ million reported infections and
189,538 reported deaths (>21% of the total reported deaths worldwide)
so far. However, as the daily new cases, hospital admissions, and deaths
began to decline in mid-May, most States in the U.S. began phased
lifting of their social intervention measures. For example, Florida
adopted a three phased approach: Phase I (which began in May 18,
2020) allowed most businesses and workplaces to reopen with up to
50% of their building capacities and with large events constrained to

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloepi.2020.100036
2590-1133/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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While we have presented the model development in the main body of
the paper using Miami-Dade County (a county of Florida with 2.8 million population) as a case study region, we have also presented a stepby-step approach (in the Appendix) on how the model can be implemented for other regions. The virus transmission model that is embedded within our AB model follows closely the approach used in [18] that
modeled a potential A(H5N1) pandemic. Instead of using real-time mobility data, access to which is limited in the U.S. for privacy reasons, we
used detailed census data for generating both population and establishments in the region. This information together with people's daily
schedules, guided by the prevailing social-behavioral norms, were
used to generate social mixing process for the COVID-19 pandemic.
The model is ﬁrst calibrated and validated with evolving daily
age-speciﬁc reported data on infection, hospitalization, and deaths.
We then extended the model into future months to forecast pandemic
impact under various intervention conditions.
Models for COVID-19 in literature are either data-driven (e.g.,
[4,5,11,17,53]) or compartmental like SEIR (susceptible, exposed, infected, and recovered) or their variants (e.g. [1,28,41,54,55]). Observation
data driven models are well suited for understanding the past progression
of a pandemic and also for estimating parameters characterizing virus epidemiology. However, they offer limited prediction ability for the future,
especially in situations where conditions are changing (e.g., testing and
treatment ability, social interventions, people's behavior, and response).
SEIR type compartmental models guided by differential equations have
been most widely used for communicable diseases, some early examples
are [13,29,30]. Such models are aggregate in nature and assume uniform
behavior of the population over time. Hence, these models also do not
adapt well to changing pace of disease transmission. As stated in [10],
an agent-based modeling approach is more suitable for a detailed consideration of individual attributes, speciﬁc disease natural history, and complex societal interventions that change over time.
The AB simulation model replicates the dynamics of the pandemic
outbreak by incorporating: 1) population demography of the outbreak
region for all age groups and their employment categories, 2) establishment information concerning numbers, sizes, and compositions of
households, schools, workplaces, and community places, 3) daily schedules for people of all age groups before and during the intervention orders (e.g., stay-at-home), 4) isolation of infected and quarantine of
household members, 5) closure of schools, workplaces, and community
places, 6) compliance to isolation and quarantine requirements, and
7) epidemiological parameters of the virus. The key epidemiological parameters include: disease natural history with average lengths of latent,
incubation, symptomatic, and recovery periods; distribution of infectiousness; percent asymptomatic; and fatality rate.
Each day, the AB model tracks the following for each person:
1) hourly movements and locations based on their daily schedules
that depend on age, employment status, prevailing intervention orders,
and quarantine/isolation status; 2) hourly contacts with other susceptible and infected; 3) force of infection accumulation; 4) start of infection;
5) visit/consult with a doctor (if symptomatic and insured); 6) testing
(if infected and visited/consulted a doctor or asymptomatic chosen for
testing either randomly or via contact tracing); 7) test reporting
delay; 8) disease progression of infected; 9) hospitalization (if infected
with acute illness); and 10) recovery or death. The AB model reports
daily and cumulative values of actual infected, doctor visits, tested, reported cases, hospitalized, recovered, and deaths, for each age category.
A schematic diagram depicting the algorithmic sequence and parameter
inputs for the AB simulation model is presented in Fig. 1.
Our AB simulation model works as follows. It begins by generating
the individual people according to the U.S. census data that gives population attributes including age (see Table A1) and occupational distribution (see Table A4). Thereafter, it generates the households based on
their composition characterized by the number of adults and children
(see Table A2). The model also generates, per census data, schools
(see Table A3) and the workplaces and other community locations

25%; Phase II (began in June 5, 2020) allowed all businesses to reopen
for up to 50–75% of their capacities and also permitted events in large
venues with no more than 50% of their capacities; Phase III will be
akin to a complete reopening for which neither a date nor the criteria
have been declared. A summary of Florida's phased intervention plan
can be seen in Figure A1 (in the Appendix). As the reopening entered
Phase II, Florida, along with many other states, began to see sharp
increases in daily new infections (e.g., Florida reported over 15,000
new cases on July 11, 2020 along with a test positivity rate reaching
over 15%).
In this paper, we investigate a few ‘what-if’ scenarios for social intervention policies including if the stay-at-home order were not lifted, if
the Phase II order continues unaltered, what impact will the universal
face mask usage have on the infections and deaths, and ﬁnally, how
do the beneﬁts of contact tracing vary with various target levels for
identifying asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic. We conduct our investigation by ﬁrst developing a comprehensive agent-based simulation
model for COVID-19, and then using a major urban outbreak region
(Miami-Dade County of Florida, USA with 2.8 million population) as
the case study for the model.
Methodology
Agent-based (AB) simulation models have been widely used to
mimic complex social contact processes and transmission dynamics of
inﬂuenza and respiratory type viruses. One of the early applications of
AB simulation model for inﬂuenza can be found in [16]. The authors examined ﬂexible immunization routines and variable vaccine response
patterns on 1957 Asian and 1968 Hong Kong pandemic strains of inﬂuenza A. In [18,19,24], authors presented AB simulation models with a
detailed approach to generate new infections using calculation of force
of infection received by susceptible from infected for potential pandemic outbreaks of A(H5N1) inﬂuenza virus in Southeast Asia and
U.S./U.K. Assessment of disease burden from a potential A(H7N9) outbreak in the U.S. was studied using an AB simulation model in [43]. AB
models have been used for examining both pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical intervention strategies, for example, mass vaccination
for smallpox outbreak [26], effectiveness of targeted antiviral prophylaxis to contain inﬂuenza before widespread availability of a vaccine
[33], development of mitigation strategies for a potential A(H5N1) outbreak using a design of experiment approach [35], optimal resource allocation among multiple regions of a country during an inﬂuenza
pandemic [51], and simulation-based reinforcement learning framework for dynamic mitigation of inﬂuenza [14].
A number of papers have appeared in recent literature using AB
models to examine COVID-19 outbreak. The papers include: an AB
model integrated with mobility data to evaluate intervention measures
such as testing, social distancing, contact tracing and quarantine for a
potential second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Boston metropolitan area [1]; a general framework of an AB simulator for COVID-19
using geo-spatial data to evaluate intervention measures such as closure
of community locations, shops, social distancing, face mask, isolation,
among others [34]; health and economic impacts of social interventions
for COVID-19 [42]; a probabilistic approach using an AB model to simulate COVID-19 transmission and evaluate mitigation strategies in a
closed built environment [15]; and a granular AB model of COVID-19
in Australia to compare school closures and varying levels of intervention strategies such as air travel, case isolation, quarantine, and social
distancing [9].
COVID-19 in the U.S. has been handled in a very decentralized manner, where mitigation policies were developed and adopted at municipality/county levels. For example, several counties within the State of
Florida, U.S.A. adopted the universal facemask policy while others
didn't. As a result, spread of SARS-CoV-2 has not been uniform. Hence,
we focused on developing a granular model that can be regionspeciﬁc and can yield outcomes to guide regional decision makers.
2

H. Tatapudi, R. Das and T.K. Das

Global Epidemiology 2 (2020) 100036

Fig. 1. A schematic of agent-based simulation model for COVID-19.
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Fig. 2. Pseudo-code for agent-based simulation model of COVID-19.
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(see Table A4). Each individual is assigned a household, while maintaining the average household composition, and, depending on the age, either a school or a workplace (considering employment levels). A daily
(hour by hour) schedule is assigned to every individual, chosen from a
set of alternative schedules, based on their attributes. The schedules
vary between weekdays and weekends and also depend on the prevailing social intervention orders (see Table A5).
Simulation begins on the day when one or more infected people are
introduced to the region (referred to as simulation day 1). Simulation
model tracks hourly movements of each individual (susceptible and infected) every day, and records for each susceptible the number of infected contacts and their identiﬁcation at each location. Based on the
level of infectiousness of each infected contact (which depends on the
day of his/her infectiousness period), the model calculates the daily
force of infection received by each susceptible from all infected contacts
at all hours of the day [18]. Daily force of infection is considered to accumulate. However, it is assumed that if a susceptible does not gather any
additional force of infection (i.e., does not come in contact with any infected) for two consecutive days, the cumulative force of infection for
the susceptible reduces to zero. At the end of each day, the model uses
cumulative force of infection to calculate the probability of infection
for each susceptible. The model updates the infection status of all individuals to account for new infections as well as disease progression of
infected individuals. A pseudo-code in Fig. 2 depicts the major elements
and structure of the agent-based simulation program.
Epidemiological models and other parameters that guide the AB
model are described next. Fig. 3 presents a schematic of the disease natural history of COVID-19, parameters of which are given in Table A6.
Once infected, an individual simultaneously begins the latency and the
incubation periods. The individual becomes infectious after the latent
period is complete but displays symptoms (unless asymptomatic) at
the end of the incubation period. The period between end of latency
and end of incubation is referred to as pre-symptomatic, a time when
the infectiousness grows rapidly and almost reaches its peak. Symptomatic cases either follow a non-acute progression (majority of cases, not
requiring hospitalization) or acute progression (requiring hospitalization). Cases for whom disease does not become acute, enter a recovery
period after infectiousness ends. Those with acute disease progression
(generally toward the end of the infectious period) are hospitalized.
After the hospital stay period, cases either recover or die. For average
lengths of recovery and hospitalized periods that are used in the AB
model, see Table A6. There is some evidence based on animal experimentation that recovered individuals may become immune to reinfection [31,40]. But other studies remain inconclusive [32]. Hence, due to
lack of established data on this matter, our model considers the recovered cases to be immune to further COVID-19 infections.
The duration and intensity of infectiousness is considered to be
guided by a lognormal density function (see Fig. 4). The function is

Fig. 4. Lognormal distribution function for infectiousness proﬁle of a COVID-19 case.

truncated at the average length of the infectiousness period (which is
considered to be 9.5 days). Asymptomatic cases are assumed to follow
a similar infectiousness intensity proﬁle but scaled by a factor (Ck in
the force of infection calculation (1), see Table A7).
The AB model estimates the probability of infection for a susceptible
i using the accumulated value of daily force of infection (λi), which is calculated as follows.
Ik βh κ ðt−τ k Þρk ½1 þ C k ðω−1Þ
nαi
X Ik βpj κ ðt−τ k Þρk ½1 þ C k ðω−1Þ

λi ¼ ∑kjhk ¼hi
þ

j

j

j;kjlk ¼li

mij

:

ð1Þ

The ﬁrst component in (1) accounts for the force experienced by
susceptible individual i at home from other infected household members k. The second component captures the force experienced at
schools/workplaces/community places for work and also at community
places visited for daily errands; this happens when a susceptible i is in
the same location type j where infected k is at hour t. The deﬁnition
and values of the parameters of (1) are given in Table A7. Eq. (1) is a
modiﬁed version of the force of infection equation given in [18],
which has three components that separately calculate force of infection
received at home, at indoor workplaces, and at outdoor community. For
the sake of simplicity, we have considered only the ﬁrst two components, home and indoor workplaces, where most of the COVID-19 transmission is assumed to be taking place. We have assumed that the mode
of virus transmission at indoor community places that are routinely visited by people as part of their daily errands (like grocery stores, home
goods stores, dine-in/take-out restaurants, etc.) is similar to that of indoor workplace transmission.
The force of infection is gathered by a susceptible individual each
day from all infected contacts in his/her mixing groups (home, school/
workplace, and community places). The cumulative value of λi is used

Fig. 3. Disease natural history of COVID-19 (see Table A6 for average lengths of the periods).
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without testing were considered to isolate at home with a given probability of compliance. The probability of compliance was considered to
vary during the length of the symptomatic period of infection. For this
purpose, we divided the symptomatic period into three parts: I, II, and
III, and assumed a lower isolation compliance in parts I and III and
higher in part II, when the illness is more apparent. See Table A10 for
the isolation compliance probabilities. Susceptible members of the
households with one or more infected cases are considered to quarantine themselves. We also assumed a level of compliance for quarantine
(see Table A10). We used hospitalization and death data reported for
Miami-Dade County [20] for each age group to obtain probabilities of
hospitalization of the reported cases, and probabilities of death for
those who are hospitalized (see Table A11).
Though we have implemented our AB simulation model for a speciﬁc region, it is quite general in its usability for other urban regions
with similar demography, societal characteristics, and intervention
measures. In our model, Tables A1–A4 summarize the demographic inputs (age and household distribution, number of schools for various age
groups, and number of workplaces of various types and sizes). These
data will need to be curated from both national and local census records.
Social interventions vary from region to region and hence the data in
Table A8 will need to be updated. Similarly, testing availability, test sensitivity, and test outcome reporting delay may also vary signiﬁcantly
from region to region, and thus Table A9 will also need to be updated.
The rest of the data (in Tables A5, A6, A7, A10, and A11) are related to
epidemiology of COVID-19. These are unlikely to be signiﬁcantly different, though some adjustments of these based on population demographics may be needed.

at the end of each day to calculate the probability of infection as
1 − exp−λi.
The AB model incorporates all applicable intervention orders like
stay-at-home, school and workplace closure, isolation of symptomatic
cases at home, and quarantine of household members of those who
are infected. The model also considers: varying levels of compliances
for isolation and quarantine, lower on-site stafﬁng levels of essential
work and community places during stay-at-home order, restricted
daily schedule of people during various social intervention periods,
phased lifting of interventions, use of face masks in workplaces, schools
and community places with varying compliance levels, and contact tracing with different target levels to identify asymptomatic and presymptomatic cases. The timeline for social interventions implemented
in the model are summarized in Table A8.
Other salient considerations in the implementation of our AB model
are as follows. Across all age groups, 35% of the infected cases were considered asymptomatic [7]. Approximately, 20% (20%) of Florida residents are reported as uninsured and do not have access to a primary
care physician [49]. Uninsured people thus considered not to have the
doctor referral required for most of the testing facilities in MiamiDade County, and hence not tested. All symptomatic cases with health
insurance were assumed to visit/consult with a doctor. Depending on
their symptoms, travel history, and contact history, some of them
were given referrals for testing. We considered that only a small percentage of cases visiting/consulting a doctor were given referrals in
the early months of the pandemic (until the middle of April 2020),
due to the shortage of testing and restrictive CDC guidelines on who
could be tested [6]. However, as CDC relaxed its test eligibility guidelines
[39] and the capacity to test increased in Florida, we gradually increased
the probability of getting a test referral from a doctor closer to 100% by
early June 2020 for symptomatic cases (see Table A9). We also considered in our model that a small fraction (reaching only up to 10% over
time) of the asymptomatic cases are randomly tested through various
community testing protocols, e.g., at elderly care facilities, healthcare facilities, workplaces, etc. Note that we did not consider co-infection, and
therefore all cases that were tested in our simulation model had COVID19. Hence, each test yielded a positive outcome with a probability equal
to the test sensitivity (see Table A9). Based on the data reported on Florida COVID-19 dashboard, a test result reporting delay of up to 10 days
on average was considered at the start of the pandemic, which was progressively reduced (see Table A9). All symptomatic cases with or

Model calibration
The AB model utilizes a large number of parameters, which are demographic parameters, epidemiological parameters, and social intervention parameters. We kept almost all of the above parameters ﬁxed at
their respective chosen values and calibrated the model by changing
values for only a few. The calibrated parameters include the transmission coefﬁcients used in calculating force of infection at home, work,
school, and community places (βh and βjp). The choice of the values of
transmission coefﬁcients was initially guided by [18] and the prevailing
estimates of R0, and thereafter adjusted at different points in time during the calibration period (ﬁrst 127 days of the simulation starting on

Fig. 5. Validation of AB simulation model results using the State reported numbers of ‘cumulative infected cases’ in ﬁg. (a) and ‘cumulative deaths’ in ﬁg. (b) for Miami-Dade County,
Florida, USA. Fig. (c) difference of the 7-day moving average between cumulative reported cases from simulation and surveillance (mean difference − 8 and 95% CI (−145 to 130)).
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Table 1
Summary of the key results from the AB simulation model implemented on a sample urban outbreak region (Miami-Dade County of Florida, USA) with population of 2.8 million.
Interventions ➞

If Stay-At-Home order were If Phase I reopening
not lifted (started March 17, continued (started May
2020)
18, 2020)

If Phase II reopening
continues without
alterations (started June
5, 2020)

If Phase II reopening continues
with mandatory use of face
masks (started June 25, 2020)

If Phase II reopening continues
with use of face masks and
contact tracing with 50% target
(starting June 30, 2020)

Early Aug. 2020

July 2021

End-Oct. 2020

End-Nov. 2020

End-Sept. 2020

162K
(136K – 188K)

600K
(530K – 670K)

2.17M
(2.16M – 2.18M)

1.74M
(1.73M – 1.75M)

581K
(447K – 716K)

23K
(19K – 27K)

220K
(186K – 254K)

866K
(854K – 877K)

714K
(702K – 726K)

247K
(178K – 316K)

4.1K*
(3.5K – 4.8K)

37.5K*
(31.7K – 43.4K)

149K*
(147K – 151K)

120K*
(119K – 122K)

35.2K*
(25.6K – 44.8K)

1K**
(0.9K – 1.2K)

9.4K**
(7.9K – 10.8K)

36.4K**
(35.8K – 36.9K)

29.7K**
(29.3K – 30.2K)

8.8K**
(6.5K – 11.1K)

Outcomes
⬇
Time when pandemic
subsides below a
threshold
Total number of
infections
(95% C.I.)
Total number of
reported cases
(95% C.I.)
Total number of
hospitalizations
(95% C.I.)
Total number of
deaths (95% C.I.)

*The numbers presented in the table were computed in mid-late June. Per State reported data, in the months of July and August, the probability of hospitalization reduced signiﬁcantly
across all age groups by over 80%. Hence, our estimates for total number of hospitalizations are much higher than the expected outcome.
**Since the deaths are simulated by applying a probability on those hospitalized, estimates of the number of deaths from our model are much higher than the expected outcome.

numbers reported in the Florida COVID-19 dashboard for Miami-Dade
County [22]. Fig. 5 (c) depicts the difference of the 7-day moving average values of simulated and actual reported number of cases.
Once the model is calibrated and validated with available reported
data on infected and dead, we extended the model into the future to
predict outcomes. The only parameters that were altered after the
calibration period are to reﬂect the expected changes in social interventions, e.g., order mandating use of face mask, re-closing some community places, expected increase in contact tracing, and changes in
community response via daily schedule restrictions. Hence, the parameters that were changed after the calibration period included those for
daily schedules, transmission coefﬁcients, testing and contact tracing
rates, and compliance to isolation and quarantine. Most of the parameter values used in the AB model were obtained from government
archives and research literature, for which references are provided

February 12 until the start of Phase II reopening order on June 5, 2020).
The transmission coefﬁcient for school was only applicable for the ﬁrst
35 days of the simulation period until the beginning of the stay-athome order on March 17, 2020. The only other parameters that were
calibrated are the number of errands in the daily schedules under various intervention conditions and the percentage of workers in essential
(e.g., utility services and grocery stores) and non-essential (e.g., ofﬁces
and restaurants) workplaces who physically reported to work during
different intervention periods. Calibration of the above parameters
was done so that the daily cumulative numbers of reported infected
cases and deaths from the AB simulation model closely match the values
published in the Florida COVID-19 dashboard until June 17, 2020. Fig. 5
(a) and (b) show the daily cumulative mean values (with 95% conﬁdence intervals) for the reported infected cases and deaths as obtained
from the simulation model. The dotted lines represent the actual

Fig. 6. Growth of actual and reported infected cases (ﬁg. (a)) and hospitalizations and deaths (ﬁg. (b)) if stay-at-home order were not lifted.
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Fig. 7. Case study outcomes (average values with 95% C.I.) of continuing with Phase I reopening (ﬁg. (a) and ﬁg. (b)) and Phase II reopening without face mask and contact tracing (ﬁg.
(c) and ﬁg. (d)).

continued without moving into Phase II, and Phase II of reopening continued without the use of face mask or any other changes. Thereafter,
we conducted a prospective examination of the impact we are likely
to see in coming days from the use of face masks and contact tracing.
We ﬁrst present a summary of the key results of our study (see
Table 1), from which a number of key insights can be derived that
may apply to other similar urban regions experiencing respiratory/inﬂuenza type virus outbreaks. Early imposition of stay-at-home order appears to have been quite effective in ﬁrst ﬂattening and then reversing
the growth curve. Per our model, if the stay-at-home order was allowed
to remain enforced, the pandemic would have subsided with a relatively
low percentage of the population (5.8%) infected and approximately
0.04% dead within six months of inception; 50 or below daily new

(see Tables A1-A11). For some of the parameters for which we could not
ﬁnd an archived data source, we used expert opinion and current media
reports.
Results
We used our model to predict the rate of growth of infected cases,
reported cases, hospitalizations, and deaths for the case study region
(Miami-Dade County, Florida, USA) under various social intervention
scenarios. First, we allowed the model to mimic retrospectively the
progress of the pandemic under three separate intervention scenarios
for a large number of days. The scenarios are: stay-at-home order continued without reopening until pandemic subsides, Phase I of reopening
8
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herd immunity by late October 2020. We note that at the time of
implementing the simulation model (late June 2020) to obtain the
above results, the percentage of hospitalized people that died was
quite high, especially at the higher age groups. However, by the time
of revising the manuscript per reviewer comments and resubmission
(early September 2020), the death rate of hospitalized COVID-19 cases
has dropped signiﬁcantly. Hence our model's predictions for the number of deaths are much higher than what is expected.
Hereafter, we used our model in a prospective examination of the
pandemic progression under Phase II with the use of face mask and contact tracing. Universal use of face mask in workplaces, schools and community places, where maintaining social distancing is not always
feasible, was added to the Phase II guidelines starting June 25, 2020 in
Miami-Dade County. In an article that analyzed data from the literature
for SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 outbreaks, it is shown that the average
value of the adjusted odds ratio (aOR) of getting an infection after wearing surgical variety face masks versus without wearing face mask is 0.33
[12]. This can be interpreted as the likelihood of getting infected if wearing a surgical variety face mask is one third of what it would be for not
wearing a mask. Hence, we considered a 67% reduction in the transmission coefﬁcient (βjp) used in calculating the force of infection (see eq.
(1)), assuming a 100% compliance in the use of surgical variety masks
at workplaces, schools and community places. We also tested the impact of 30% and 45% reductions in the transmission coefﬁcient value
(βjp), which translate to approximately 50% and 70% compliance for
face mask usage, respectively. The anticipated impact of face mask
usage together with Phase II order on the average cumulative numbers
of infected are shown in Fig. 8(a). It also depicts the risk difference between the average values of cumulative infected without and with the
universal use of face mask. It may be noted that since the infections
grow slower with the use of face mask, the cumulative risk difference
rises to almost 875 K in the middle of August and then settles down
close to 430 K, when pandemic is predicted to subside by the end of November 2020. Fig. 8(b) depicts the daily values of the average infected
for Phase II without and with the universal face mask policy. As expected, the peak of daily infections with face mask usage shifted to a
slightly later date and the downward trend began after a smaller percentage (31%) of the total population are infected compared to 36%
without the use of face mask.
Though the universal use of face mask together with the Phase II
order is likely to reduce a large number of infections (an estimated
430 K), this strategy still leaves a high percentage (63%) of the total population infected before the pandemic is predicted to subside, likely after
reaching herd immunity. While a vaccine is still unavailable, perhaps

infections was used as the criterion to consider that pandemic has subsided in Miami-Dade County. If the extent of social mixing akin to Phase
II reopening of Florida is in place for an urban region (without the use of
face mask and contact tracing), the pandemic would likely have raged
for 8–9 months and subside only after reaching herd immunity with
over 75% of the population infected and 1.3% of the population dead.
Universal use of face masks of surgical variety was shown by the
model to reduce average total infected, hospitalized, and dead by 20%,
19%, and 15%, respectively. Aggressive contact tracing with a goal to
identify 50% of the asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic was also
projected to have a very signiﬁcant positive impact with an average reduction of 66% of total infected. The average reductions in total infected
with 40%, 30%, and 20% contact tracing targets were found to be 58%,
41%, and 14%, respectively.
In what follows, we expound the results from our study. Figs. 6 and 7
show the simulation results for the retrospective examination scenarios
with average values (with 95% CIs in shade) of daily cumulative cases of
actual infected, reported, hospitalized, and dead. The blue dotted lines
represent the actual numbers of infected and dead as reported in the
Florida COVID-19 dashboard till June 24 (our calibration period was
till June 17).
Fig. 6 shows a strong inﬂuence of continuing with the stay-at-home
order in curbing the COVID-19 growth within approximately 6 months
from its inception with on average less than 5.8% of the population infected, 0.15% hospitalized, and 0.037% dead; 50 or below daily new infections was used as the criterion to consider that pandemic has
subsided in Miami-Dade County. Such a quick suppression of a virus
outbreak always leaves the possibility of resurgence, for which an effective plan of contact tracing, testing, isolation, and support for those isolated (when needed) should be in place.
Fig. 7 shows the expected outcomes of continuing with the Phase I
order and the Phase II order. Fig. 7(a) demonstrates a clear upward
swing of the number of infected by the end of May as a result of Phase
I reopening, in contrast to stay-at-home scenario where the numbers
actually begin to drop at the end of May. The upward trajectory continues for nearly 12 months after reopening before curving down and
subsiding the pandemic in July 2021. This scenario would have resulted
in on average approximately 21% of the population infected (see ﬁg.
(a)), 1.3% hospitalized, and 0.34% dead (see ﬁg. (b)). Figs. 7(c) and 7
(d) depict the rather grim outcome of continuing with Phase II order
without face mask where over 75% of the population gets infected,
5.5% of the population hospitalized, and 1.3% dead. The steep multifold increase in the number of infected in late June after the Phase II
reopening in June 5 results in an expected end of the pandemic via

Fig. 8. (a): Impact of face mask usage starting June 25 (together with Phase II order) on the average cumulative infected for all compliance levels; ﬁg. (b): Impact of universal use of face
mask on the average daily infected.
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Fig. 9. Impact of contact tracing, starting on June 30, during Phase II with universal face mask usage.
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of the ratio of average actual infected to average reported for a few scenarios: Phase II continued, Phase II with universal face mask usage, and
Phase II with universal face mask usage and contact tracing with a 30%
target. Values of these ratios are shown in Fig. 9(f). It can be seen that
in the initial days of the pandemic, the ratios are very high (close to
30), which we believe is due to under testing together with long
reporting delay. However, as the testing of the symptomatic increased
and reporting delay decreased over time, the ratios came down sharply
to 10 and continued to fall to near 7. The ratios are expected to further
decrease gradually to about 2.5 as the predicted values of daily new infections begin to fall starting late July and early August.

the only other way to reduce the size of this impacted population is
through contact tracing. We used our model to examine a number of
different contact tracing strategies by adding them to the scenario of
Phase II with universal face mask usage. We implemented contact tracing starting June 30 with a number of different targets (20%, 30%, 40%,
and 50%) of identifying asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic cases. The
impact on the average cumulative values of actual infected and the reported cases are shown in Figs. 9(a) and 9(b). It can be observed that
contact tracing can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of people infected.
With the 50% target for contact tracing (which is an aggressive goal),
the average cumulative number of infected by the time the daily number of new infections falls below a threshold (possibly by the end of September 2020) would reduce to 581 K from over 1.73 million with Phase
II and face mask alone (a 66% reduction). The corresponding reductions
in cumulative infections and the associated times for pandemic to subside that can be expected from contact tracing targets of 40%, 30%, and
20% are 58% (mid-October), 41% (mid-November), and 14% (mid-December). It may also be noted that the impact of contact tracing target
on the reduction of cumulative infected is nonlinear. Figs. 9(c) and 9
(d) show the average cumulative numbers of hospitalizations and
deaths. Expected reductions in hospitalization achieved from contact
tracing targets of 50%, 40%, 30%, and 20% compared to the use of face
mask alone (during Phase II) are 71%, 62%, 43%, and 14%, respectively.
The corresponding expected reductions in the number of deaths are
70%, 62%, 43%, and 14%, respectively. We note again that since we completed our simulations runs in late June, the death rates of those hospitalized for all ages have dropped multi-fold during the months of July
and August. Thus, our predicted numbers of deaths as depicted in
Fig. 9(d) are much higher than what is expected.
Fig. 9(e) shows the impact of contact tracing starting on June 30,
2020 on the average daily infected values. It is interesting to note from
the ﬁgure that an aggressive contact tracing/testing and isolation of
those found infected appears to be capable of quickly turning the tide
on new infections. Various COVID-19 dashboards maintained by government and private agencies have been reporting data including numbers of infected (tested positive), hospitalized, and dead. But the actual
numbers of infected people in the outbreak regions remain a subject of
expert opinion. Speculations abound place the ratio of actual to reported
numbers of infected to as high as 10. As our simulation model yields estimates of the actual number of infected, we calculated the daily values

Discussion
We have presented in this paper an agent-based simulation model
for COVID-19 pandemic to serve as a policy evaluation tool for public
health decision makers. We have implemented the model on one of
the epicenters of COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S. (Miami-Dade County
of Florida, an urban metropolitan region with 2.8 million population).
The model implementation demonstrates the efﬁcacy of our model in
both retrospective and prospective assessment of a number of social intervention strategies via their impact on the numbers of infected, hospitalized, and deaths. We have analyzed sensitivity of a number of
intervention parameters (partial closures, compliance of face mask
usage, and contact tracing targets) in order to support the task of decision making by our public health policy makers.
Our simulation model is written in C/C++ and implemented using
GNU General Public License [25].
Our model offers the ﬂexibility to implement a variety of societal
conditions including test availability, test reporting delay, stay-athome order, partial reopening, selective closures of schools and workplaces when infections reappear, use of face mask with various levels
of compliance, contact tracing, vaccinations, and use of antivirals. Only
a subset of these conditions has been examined and reported in this
paper. At the time of revising the manuscript for resubmission for publication, in order to retool the model to reﬂect changing conditions, we
further calibrated our model until July 15, 2020. The recalibrated model
was validated by comparing age-speciﬁc values of average number of
cases reported, hospitalized, and dead for months March to September
with the data published in the Florida COVID-19 dashboard for Miami-

Fig. 10. Validation of calibrated simulation model using state reported surveillance numbers for cumulative reported cases. Fig. (a): Cumulative plot of the average reported cases from
simulation (with 95% CI) along with surveillance data. Fig (b): Plot of the difference between cumulative values of average reported cases from simulation and surveillance.
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reports. Hence, the model results, as presented in this paper, are only
expected outcomes based on currently available information.
Each scenario of our case study with 10 replicates (with different
seeds) takes approximately 8–12 h to run in a standard desktop computer with Intel Core i7 with 16GB memory. In the interest of presenting
our observations quickly to the public health decision makers, while
COVID-19 is still rampant in the region, we chose to use a limited number (10) of replicates. As the main purpose of this paper is to conduct a
broad what-if analysis, we do not believe that use of a small number of
replicates has negatively inﬂuenced our observations. The trends and
observations derived from our results are only intended to be used for
planning and guidance of public health decision makers.
As part of our continuing (future) work, we plan to use our model to
examine the impact of reopening of K-12 schools and colleges/universities for the new academic year, which began at the end of August and
early September. We also plan to use our AB model to assess efﬁcacy
of various prioritization strategies (based on age, risk, and work groups)
for the vaccines that are anticipated to be available in limited quantities
by the beginning of 2021.

Dade County until September 30, 2020 [22]. See Fig. A2 in Appendix for
monthly comparisons. Fig. 10 (a) shows the cumulative values (with
95% conﬁdence interval) of the average reported cases as obtained
from the recalibrated simulation model. The dotted line represents the
actual numbers of reported cases from the Florida COVID-19 dashboard.
Fig. 10 (b) shows the error between simulated and surveillance values
for the cumulative number of reported cases.
Our agent-based model has several limitations. First and foremost,
the simulation model is an abstraction of how a pandemic impacts a
large and complex society. Though our model deliberately introduces
some variabilities, somewhat pre-deﬁned daily schedules are used to
approximate a highly dynamic contact process of an urban region.
Also, the contact process does not account for signiﬁcant variabilities
in the types and lengths of interactions even within each mixing groups.
We did not assign geographic locations (latitude and longitude) for
households, businesses, schools, and community places, and assumed
them to be uniformly distributed over the region. It is common for
urban population centers and associated establishments to grow in clusters, for which the contact patterns are expected to be different from
those in uniformly dispersed regions. We did not consider special
events like parties, games, and street protests, some of which are
known to have caused superspreading of the virus and case increases.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the model uses a large number
of parameters (listed in Tables A1 through A11 in the Appendix), and
hence the model predictions are inﬂuenced by the choice of those
values. We have used published data from the government archives
and research literature for most of the parameters. In absence of
established data source, we have used expert opinion and media
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Appendix
Step-by-step approach for implementing the AB simulation model for a pandemic outbreak region.
In what follows, we present a detailed outline of a step-by-step approach for implementing our AB simulation model for a pandemic outbreak in a
region caused by inﬂuenza or respiratory viruses, as in COVID-19 that is affecting the world. The main body of the paper uses Miami Dade County
of Florida, USA as the case study region. Here we use another region, Boston city/Suffolk County, as an example.
Step 1: Model input data gathering.
The following data must be gathered as the ﬁrst step for applying our AB simulation model to another region like Boston city/Suffolk County.
1) Population distribution by age: U.S. census bureau provides county speciﬁc age distribution data. For the chosen region, e.g., Boston city/Suffolk
county, this information can be found in [A1].
2) Household composition of adults and children: Family compsition with sizes of adults and children may not be directly available for all regions, it
can be calculated using other sources, like [A2], which provides Boston's households by type and size. Composition of adult and children in these
households can be assumed to be similar to another comparable city/county region in the U.S for which data is available.
3) Distribution of categories of workplaces: U.S. Census bureau provides, for various industry types, the number of establishments and the corresponding size of employment[A3]. This national data can be proportioned for the speciﬁc region if county data is not avaialble.
4) Characterization of workplaces (essential or non-essential): Essential and non-essential workplace characterization can be gathered from state
level data, if available. In most regions within the U.S., this characterization can be assumed to be similar. A list of essential and non-essential
characterization for the state of Massachusetts can be found in [A4].
5) Employment levels at various workplace categories, and unemployment: This data is provided by U.S. Census for some counties and states. Refer to
[A3] for data for Boston. When this data is unavailable, national estimates can be used in proportion to the population of the region.
6) Percentage uninsured: U.S. Census data's quick facts provides this information [A5].
7) Distribution of schools (K-12, colleges and universities): Total number of schools and stafﬁng levels are categorized as public and private. For information on public schools, see [A7], and for private schools, see [A8].
8) Distribution of school attendance (K-12, colleges and universities): Enrollment levels in public and private schools for K-12 and universities can be
found in [A6].
9) Social intervention policies: Multi-phased policies are commonly used in most regions in the U.S. However, the dates and the nature of these intervention policies vary widely from region to region. For example, Alaska, Arizona and Georgia, among others, didn't have a mandatory face
mask policy, while other states did. Some states did not have a statewide policy, but each municipality adopted their own.
a) Lockdown policy: Time-varying policy applicable for Boston city/Suffolk County can be found in [A11].
b) Policies for phased lifting of social interventions: Time-varying policy applicable for Boston city/Suffolk County can be found in [A11].
c) Use of face mask: Boston implemented a facemask policy in early May in an executive order by the State [A9].
d) Implementation of contact tracing: Massachusetts state government provides a dashboard on the community health outcomes for COVID-19. Details on the success of contact tracing in the communities along with the outcome measures varying over time can be found in [A10].
e) Policy for returning to school: School reopening policies also widely vary from state to state and also among counties within a state. Information
on Boston's public school reopening policy can be found in [A12]. It is important to frequently check sources on school policy as they are transient. For example, Boston planned to reopen on October 15, but shifted to October 22 after seeing an increase in the number of cases.
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10) Time varying testing of symptomatic and asymptomatic: Limited testing availability has been a serious concern in many U.S. regions that suffered
from a high level of disease spread. Time varying data on test availability and test outcome reporting delay are difﬁcult to ﬁnd in indexed literature during a pandemic. Hence, these can be assumed from regional news reports, test reporting data, and/or other grey literature.
11) Number of reported, hospitalized and deaths: Daily data and archived data on the number of people reported positive, hospitalized and dead can be
found from dashboard in [A10].
12) Probability of hospitalization for reported cases and probability of death for hospitalized: This can be calculated from [A10] based on age speciﬁc
reporting.
The information contained in the following tables for Miami Dade County are likely to be same for other regions like Boston city/Suffolk County.
13) Daily schedules for people can be assumed to be same as in Table A5.
14) Disease natural history parameters for COVID-19 can be assumed to be same across regions within a country, see Table A6.
15) Some of the parameters in Table A7 for calculating the force of infection need to be calibrated (see Step 3). However, the remaining parameters in
Table A7 can be assumed to be same.
16) Self-isolation compliance for symptomatic cases, and quarantine compliance for household members can be assumed to be same for different
urban regions within a country, as in Table A10.
Step 2: Updating the simulation model.
Once the input data collection is complete, the next step is to update the model parameters as follows.
1) Update the simulation model with all gathered input data from step 1: After gathering data, it needs to be curated and transformed into .txt ﬁles to be
read by the simulation model. Some of the data are directly coded in the model, where applicable.
2) Decide simulation begin date: Simulation begin date depends on the outbreak region and is based on the date of the ﬁrst reported case. Up to
14 days before the ﬁrst reported case can be used as a potential date for simulation model to begin.
3) Decide simulation end date: Simulation end date is chosen as desired by the modeler.
4) Number of initial infected cases: Most Departments of Health (DOH) provide a count and characterization of the number of initial infected cases
with travel histories. One can identify these initial infected cases during the ﬁrst month of the outbreak and use those cases to initiate social
mixing and community spread.
Step 3: Calibrate and validate simulation model.
Once the simulation model is updated with the input data for the region, the model is calibrated using a small applicable subset of input data and the
model output is validated with actual surveillance data from the region, as follows.
1) Generate multiple seeds for the uniform random variables that are used to calculate the probabilities of infection, hospitalization, death, testing, symptomatic, disease severity, test sensitivity, compliance for isolation and quarantine, among others. Simulation output from each seed is considered a replicate. Using output data from all replicates, an average value and a corresponding conﬁdence interval for each output measure are calculated.
2) A set of initial values of the transmission coefﬁcients for home, school, work, and community places are assumed (based on current literature and
published models for outbreaks of similar diseases). These transmission coefﬁcients (along with other parameters, see Table A7) are used for calculating force of infection, which is then used to calculate the probability of infection. Different sets of transmission coefﬁcient values are selected
for different reference points in time in the simulation, depending on changes in social intervention status and signiﬁcant current events. For example, the transmission coefﬁcients are appropriately calibrated (reduced) on the day universal use of facemask is announced. Also, percentage
testing of asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic are increased when contact tracing begins. Street protests combined with Independence Day holiday in early July 2020 are examples of current events that may require adjustment of transmission coefﬁcient values.
3) Other parameters that are considered suitable for the AB model calibration are probability of running errand that guides daily schedule and probability of employees reporting to work for essential and non-essential businesses. These values can also be assumed to change over time during a
pandemic depending on the phased intervention policies implemented by the government in the outbreak region.
4) The simulation is calibrated for a chosen period. In this study, the model was calibrated up to July 15th, as reported data was available until that
date for validation purposes at the time of model calibration.
5) Results for reported cases, hospitalized, and dead for all age groups are gathered from the simulation model for each seed.
6) Average values (with conﬁdence interval) are computed for the numbers of reported, hospitalized and dead.
7) For model validation, the simulated average values for the reported, hospitalized, and dead and compared with actual surveillance data.
8) Alter calibration parameters as needed to obtain desired level of validation accuracy. Measure validation accuracy is calculated as the difference in
the seven-day moving average between simulated and surveillance data.
Step 4: Implement calibrated model for prediction
1) Run calibrated simulation model for all seeds for a desired prediction period beyond the calibration/validation time.
2) Extract age speciﬁc data for total infected, reported cases, hospitalized, and dead from simulation for each seed.
3) Report mean and conﬁdence interval.
References for step by step approach
[A1] United Census Bureau. ACS Demographic And Housing Estimates: 2019, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=Boston%20city,%20Suffolk%
20County,%20Massachusetts&tid = ACSDP1Y2019.DP05&hidePreview = false; [accessed 10.06.2020].
[A2] The Boston Planning and Development Agency. Boston by the numbers 2018, http://www.bostonplans.org/getattachment/3e8bfacf-27c14b55-adee-29c5d79f4a38; [accessed 10.06.2020].
[A3] United Census Bureau. Annual Business Survey: Statistics for Employer Firms by Industry, Sex, Ethnicity, Race, and Veteran Status for the U.S.,
States, Metro Areas, Counties, and Places: 2017, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=employment%20size%20boston%20&t=Employment&tid=
ABSCS2017.AB1700CSA01&hidePreview=false; [accessed 10.06.2020].
[A4] Mass.gov. COVID-19 Essential Services, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/covid-19-essential-services; [accessed 10.06.2020].
[A5] United Census Bureau. QuickFacts Boston City, Massachusetts, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/bostoncitymassachusetts#qf-ﬂag-X;
[accessed 10.06.2020].
[A6] United Census Bureau. School Enrollment, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=Boston%20city,%20Suffolk%20County,%20Massachu
setts&t = Education&tid = ACSST1Y2019.S1401&hidePreview = false; [accessed 10.06.2020].
[A7] BPS Communications Ofﬁce. Boston Public Schools At A Glance 2019–2020, https://www.bostonpublicschools.org/cms/lib/MA01906464/
Centricity/Domain/187/BPS%20at%20a%20Glance%202019-20_FINAL.pdf; [accessed 10.06.2020].
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[A8] Private School Review. Largest Massachusetts Private Schools, https://www.privateschoolreview.com/school-size-stats/massachusetts;
[accessed 10.06.2020].
[A9] AARP.org. State-by-State Guide to Face Mask Requirements, https://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-2020/states-mask-mandatescoronavirus.html; [accessed 10.06.2020].
[A10] Mass.gov. COVID-19 Response Reporting, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/covid-19-response-reporting; [accessed 10.06.2020].
[A11] Mass.gov. COVID-19 State of Emergency, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/covid-19-state-of-emergency; [accessed 10.06.2020].
[A12] Boston Public Schools. Important Information About School Reopening, https://www.bostonpublicschools.org/reopening2020; [accessed
10.06.2020].

Fig. A1. Florida's phased social intervention plan for COVID-19 pandemic [44].

Fig. A2. Validation of simulation model by comparing monthly average values of reported cases, hospitalized, and deaths (in orange) with the corresponding reported values from Florida
COVID-19 Dashboard (in blue). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Table A1
Age distribution of Miami-Dade population [47].
Age range

Percentage

0–5
6–9
10–14
15–17
18–22
23–29
30–64
65–99

6.9
4.2
5.8
3.5
6.1
9.5
47.8
16.2

Table A2
Household composition of adults and children in Miami-Dade County of Florida, USA [37].
Household type

Percentage

1 adult 0 children
1 adult 1 children
2 adults 0 children
1 adult 2 children
2 adults 1 children
3 adults 0 children
1 adult 3 children
2 adults 2 children
4 adults 0 children
1 adult 4 children
2 adults 3 children
3 adults 3 children
4 adults 3 children

23
1
26
3
6
10
1
6
8
1
8
4
3

Table A3
Distribution of educational institutions in Miami-Dade County; all children ages 6–22 are assumed to attend school; among all children in ages 0–5, only 50,540 are assumed to attend
school; the remaining children stay at home [36,50].
Age range

School type

Percentage

Number of schools

Number of classes
in each school

Average number of
students in each class

Average number of students in attending each school

0–5
6–9
10–14
15–17
18–22

Pre-K
Elementary
Junior
Senior
College/University

26
16
22
13
23

190
323
147
232
9

14
20
44
22
375

19
19
25
19
50

266
380
1100
418
18,750

Table A4
Distribution of different types of workplaces in Miami-Dade County. All industries and community places are classiﬁed into essential or non-essential. Essential industries remain functional with a percentage of their workforce reporting during interventions like stay-at-home or phased reopening. Non-essential industries are considered to operate remotely. Essential
industries include wholesale trade, waste management and remediation services, agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing and hunting, mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction, utilities, construction,
manufacturing, transportation and warehousing. Non-essential industry includes ﬁnance and insurance, real estate and rental and leasing, professional, scientiﬁc and technical services,
management of companies and enterprises, administrative and support for waste management and remediation services, educational services, other services except public administration.
Essential community includes grocery stores, convenience stores, pharmacies and drug stores, home centers, health care and social assistance. Non-essential community includes retail,
arts, entertainment and recreation and accommodation and food services. For details on education institutions, see Table A3. The total employed population in Miami-Dade County is
1,171,404 [45,46,48].
Category of workplaces

Number of establishments

Average number of people
working in each

Number of mixing groups
in each establishment

Average number of people
in each mixing group

Essential industry
Essential industry
Essential industry
Essential industry
Essential industry
Essential industry
Non-essential industry
Non-essential industry
Non-essential industry
Non-essential industry
Non-essential industry
Non-essential industry
Essential community
Essential community

19,378
356
205
81
12
6
37,002
546
346
100
26
8
10,709
237

6
100
200
400
600
1000
6
100
200
400
600
1000
6
100

1
2
4
8
12
20
1
2
4
8
12
20
1
2

6
50
50
50
50
50
6
50
50
50
50
50
6
50
(continued on next page)
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Table A4 (continued)
Category of workplaces

Number of establishments

Average number of people
working in each

Number of mixing groups
in each establishment

Average number of people
in each mixing group

Essential community
Essential community
Essential community
Essential community
Non-essential community
Non-essential community
Non-essential community
Non-essential community
Non-essential community
Educational institution
Educational institution
Educational institution
Educational institution
Educational institution

236
41
17
19
14,571
601
296
87
32
190
323
147
232
9

200
400
600
1000
6
100
200
400
600
42
60
176
66
1500

4
8
12
20
1
2
4
8
12
14
20
44
22
375

50
50
50
50
6
50
50
50
50
3
3
4
3
4

Table A5
Daily schedules for adults and children.
Employed Adults

Unemployed Adults

If isolated or
Quarantined or under
stay-at-home order
If isolated or
Quarantined or otherwise
under Phase I or
Phase II order

Children

• At school from 8 AM –
• Runs 3 errands during three randomly selected hours
3 PM
between 8 AM and 7 PM
• Home 4 PM – 8 AM
• Home from 7 PM – 8 AM
• Engages in 3 activities
• Runs 3 errands during three randomly selected hours
from 8 AM - 7 PM
between
8 AM and 7 PM
• Stay at home
• Runs one errands during a randomly selected hour between
8 AM and 7 PM with probability 0.2 (and applicable
compliance probability)
• Stay at home
• Runs 2 errands during two randomly selected hours
between
8 AM and 7 PM with probability 0.4 in
Phase I and 0.8 in Phase II (and applicable compliance probabilities for isolated and
quarantined)

Weekday (regular schedule • At work from 8 AM – 4 PM
before social intervention)
• One errand (for one hour) between 5 and 7 PM
• Home from 7 PM – 8 AM
Weekend (regular schedule • Runs 3 errands during three randomly selected hours
before social intervention) between 8 AM and 7 PM
• Runs one errands during a randomly selected hour
between 8 AM and 7 PM with probability 0.2
(and applicable compliance probability)
• Runs 2 errands during two randomly selected hours
between 8 AM and 7 PM with probability 0.4 in Phase
I and 0.8 in Phase II (and applicable compliance
probabilities for isolated and quarantined)

Table A6
Disease natural history parameters of COVID-19.
Disease natural history parameters

Average value

Latent period
Incubation period
Contagious period
Asymptomatic percentage

3 days [27]
5.5 days [38]
9.5 days [27]
35% [7]

Health outcome parameters

Average value

Percent of Florida residents without health insurance
Time to visit doctor for symptomatic
Symptomatic (who visits/consults doctor) not hospitalized assumed to be recovered for normal activity
Symptomatic who do not visit/consult doctor assumed to resume normal activity
Time to hospitalization
Hospitalized period / time to recovery/death for hospitalized

20% [49]
1–2 days after onset of symptoms
14 days from after doctor visit
8.5 days after onset of symptoms
5–9 days after onset of symptoms [23]
9–12 days after hospitalization [8]

Table A7
Parameters of the force of infection (eq. (1)).
Parameter Description

Value

Ik
βh

1 if infected and 0 otherwise

Infected status of an individual k
Transmission coefﬁcient at homea

Period
Before
stay-at-home
orders
During
stay-at-home
orders
During Phase I
During Phase II
Work

0.7

0.015

βjp

Transmission coefﬁcient at school, work, and
community placesa

0.5
0.5
School
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Table A7 (continued)
Parameter Description

κ(t)
ρk
Ck
ω
α
ni
mij

Value
0.7

0.8

0.18

0.0

0.025

0.0065

0.0
0.0
Lognormal function value at t with
μ = 1.16315081 and σ = 0.668047
1
1 if severe/symptomatic, 0 for
mild/asymptomatic
2 for severe infection relative to a mild one

0.5
0.5

0.057
0.22

Before stay-athome order
During stay-athome order
During Phase I
During Phase II

Infectiousness at time t (t denotes the elapsed time
after completion of latency)b
Relative infectiousness of individual kc
Scaling factor for mild/asymptomatic vs severe
infectionc
Scaling factor for infectiousness for a mild vs severe
infectionc
0.8
Scaling factor for household sizec
Number of people in the household of individual i
Calculated from simulation
Number of people in the place type j where individual i Calculated from simulation
is

a
Choice of these parameters were guided by Ferguson [18], literature estimates of R0
for SARS-CoV-2, and prevailing interventions. Transmission coefﬁcients were subsequently calibrated to arrive at the values given here.
b
Parameters of the lognormal distribution function were selected to have the mean
length of infection as 4 days and a standard deviation of 3 days [27].
c
Selected from Ferguson [18].

Table A8
Social intervention order timeline for Miami-Dade County [44].
Intervention policy implemented
at Miami-Dade County, Florida, U.S.

Date of implementation

Day of Simulation

Stay at home policy
Phase I reopening
Phase II reopening
Mandatory usage of Face mask
Contact tracing (assumed to begin)

March 172,020
May 182,020
June 52,020
June 252,020
June 302,020

35
97
115
135
140

Table A9
Time varying data of testing rate, test sensitivity, and test result reporting delay. (values are based on expert opinion, news reports, and Florida COVID-19 Dashboard data [22])
Date range

Proportion of asymptomatic cases randomly
tested (before contact tracing)

Proportion of symptomatic
cases who are tested⁎

Test sensitivity

Test result reporting delay

Feb 12, 2020 – March 12, 2020
March 13, 2020 – April 11, 2020
April 12, 2020 – May 11, 2020
May 12, 2020 – June 5, 2020
June 6, 2020 – July 10, 2020
July 11, 2020 onwards

0.05
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.1
0.1

0.2
0.2
0.3
0.6
0.85
0.9

0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.9

10
7
7
6
2
2⁎

⁎ Test result reporting delay appeared to have increased again to up to a week or more
in Florida, but not implemented in the model.
Table A10
Self-isolation compliance for symptomatic cases and quarantine compliance for household members.
Parameter

Value⁎

Isolation compliance of adults in Part I of symptomatic period
Isolation compliance of adults in Part II of symptomatic period
Isolation compliance of adults in Part III of symptomatic period
Isolation compliance of children in Part I of symptomatic period
Isolation compliance of children in Part II of symptomatic period
Isolation compliance of children in Part III of symptomatic period
Duration of Part I of symptomatic period
Duration of Part II of symptomatic period
Duration of Part III of symptomatic period
Quarantine compliance of susceptible in households with infected

75%
95%
90%
80%
99%
95%
1.5 days
3.5 days
2 days
75%

⁎ Values are assumed based on expert opinion.
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Table A11
Probability of hospitalization for reported cases and probability of death for hospitalized [21].
Age range

Probability of hospitalization among those reported

Probability of death among those hospitalized

0–4
5–14
15–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
65–74
75–84
85–100

0.08
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.10
0.14
0.20
0.34
0.46
0.49

0.00
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.13
0.25
0.37
0.57

[21] Florida COVID-19 Response. COVID-19: summary of persons being monitored, persons tested, and cases. http://ww11.doh.state.ﬂ.us/comm/_partners/covid19_
report_archive/state_reports_latest.pdf;; 2020. accessed 07.15.2020.
[22] Florida Department of Health, Division of Disease Control and Health Protection.
Florida's COVID-19 Data and Surveillance Dashboard. https://experience.arcgis.
com/experience/96dd742462124fa0b38ddedb9b25e429;. accessed 07.07.2020.
[23] Garg S, Kim L, Whitaker M, O’Halloran A, Cummings C, Holstein R, et al. Hospitalization rates and characteristics of patients hospitalized with laboratory-conﬁrmed coronavirus disease 2019 — COVID-NET, 14 states, march 1–30, 2020. MMWR. 2020;
69(15):458–64http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6915e3.
[24] Germann T, Kadau K, Longini I, Macken C. Mitigation strategies for pandemic inﬂuenza in the United States. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2006;103(15):5935–40. https://
doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0601266103.
[25] GNU Operating System. GNU General Public License. https://www.gnu.org/licenses/
gpl-3.0.en.html;. accessed 07.07.2020.
[26] Halloran ME, Longini IM, Nizam A, Yang Y. Containing bioterrorist smallpox. Science.
2002;298(5597):1428–32. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1074674.
[27] Health Information and Quality Authority. Evidence summary for COVID-19 viral
load over course of infection. https://www.hiqa.ie/sites/default/ﬁles/2020-04/
Evidence-Summary_COVID-19_duration-of-infectivity-viral-load_0.pdf;; 2020.
accessed 05.08.2020.
[28] Hou C, Chen J, Zhou Y, Hua L, Yuan J, He S, et al. The effectiveness of quarantine of
Wuhan City against the Corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19): a well-mixed SEIR
model analysis. J Med Virol. 2020;92(7):841–8. https://doi.org/10.1002/jmv.25827.
[29] Kaufman HJ, Edlund S, Douglas VJ. Infectious Disease Modeling: Creating a Community to Respond to Biological Threats. Statistical Communications in Infectious Diseases. 2009;1(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/1948-4690.1001.
[30] Kermack WO, McKendrick GA. A contribution to the mathematical theory of epidemics. Bull Math Biol. 1991;53:1–2. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1933.0106.
[31] Kirkcaldy R, King B, Brooks J. COVID-19 and Postinfection immunity. JAMA. 2020;
323(22):2245. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.7869.
[32] Linlin B, Deng W, Gao H, Xiao C, Liu J, Xue J, et al. Lack of Reinfection in Rhesus Macaques Infected with SARS-CoV-2 bioRxiv ; 2020. https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.03.
13.990226.
[33] Longini IM, Halloran ME, Nizam A, Yang Y. Containing Pandemic Inﬂuenza with Antiviral Agents. Am J Epidemiol. 2004;159(7):623–33.
[34] Mahmood I, Arnabnejad H, Suleimenova D, Sassoon I, Marshan A, Serrano A, et al.
FACS: A geospatial agent-based simulator for analyzing COVID-19 spread and public
health measures on local regions. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/20914;
2020.
[35] Martinez D, Das T. Design of non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies for pandemic inﬂuenza outbreaks. BMC Public Health. 2014;14(1). https://doi.org/10.
1186/1471-2458-14-1328.
[36] Miami Dade County Public Schools. STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS 2018–2019. http://
drs.dadeschools.net/StatisticalHighlights/M970%20-%20ATTACHMENT%20%20
Statistical%20Highlights%2018-19.pdf;; 2019.
[37] Miami Matters. Households/Income Data for County: Miami-Dade. http://www.
miamidadematters.org/demographicdata?id=414&sectionId=936;; 2020. accessed
05.08.2020.
[38] Midas-network, 2020. COVID-19/parameter_estimates/2019_novel_coronavirus/,
https://github.com/midas-network/COVID-19/tree/master/parameter_
estimates/2019_novel_coronavirus; 2020 [accessed 07.07.2020]
[39] Nitkin K, Johns Hopkins Medicine. Coronavirus Screening Test Developed at Johns
Hopkins. https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/coronavirus/articles/screening-test.
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